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Notes
THE EFFECT OF A LAND SALE CONTRACT INVOLVING
PROPERTY HELD IN JOINT TENANCY
This article has been prompted by the decision of Buford v.
Dahlke1 which adds another legal facet to the Nebraska law re-
garding transactions involving property held in joint tenancy.
I. Problem Raised By Buford v. Dahlke
In 1949, "Ernest R. Dahlke and Laura H. Dahlke, husband
and wife" entered into a written contract of sale and purchase
whereby they agreed to sell property owned by them as joint ten-
ants to "George N. Chadwell and J. Louise Chadwell, as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship." The contract price of
$4750 was to be paid partly in cash and the balance in deferred
installments payable to "Ernest R. Dahlke and Laura H. Dahlke,
husband and wife." The Dahlkes' were not referred to in any
capacity or status other than as husband and wife. The vendees
had paid $192 to Laura Dahlke after the death of her husband in
January, 1951, leaving a balance owing of approximately $2930.
The administrator of the estate claimed as an asset one-half of
all the money paid or to be paid on the contract after the death
of Ernest Dahlke. The wife of the deceased refused to account to
the administrator and claimed, by right of survivorship, full
ownership of the proceeds of the contract. The vendees main-
tained that "they should, and they have declared that they would"
pay only to the wife of the deceased.
The court held that at the execution of the land sale contract
the joint tenancy was destroyed and, by equitable conversion, the
real estate was converted into personalty consisting of the land
sale contract and the benefits therefrom which were owned by
the vendors as tenants in common at the time of the death of
Ernest Dahlke. Therefore, the decedent's undivided one-half in-
terest passed to his estate as an asset; the decedent's wife was
required to account to the administrator for payments received
after the death of her husband; and the vendees were required
to make payments divided equally between the administrator and
surviving vendor.
This decision is one of first impression in Nebraska insofar
as it declares that a joint tenancy is destroyed by a land sale con-
tract which is entered into by all the joint tenants. In this situa-
1158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954).
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tion the joint tenancy is not turned into a tenancy in common
with respect to the property sold because there no longer is prop-
erty to which such a type of ownership could attach. The prop-
erty ownership vests in the purchasers at the time the contract
was made.2 Also, this situation is to be distinguished from the
case where one of two joint tenants sells or conveys his interest
to a third person. Such a transaction operates to sever the joint
tenancy and thereby cause such third person and the other origi-
nal joint tenant to hold the property as tenants in common, each
owning an undivided one half interest.3
A. PROCEEDS HELD BY TENANTS IN COMMON
The tenancy in common which the court speaks of as being
created in the Buford case does not attach to the real estate sold
but rather to the property resulting from the equitable conver-
sion, namely, the land sale contract and benefits accruing there-
from. But why was this property declared to be held under a
tenancy in common and not under a joint tenancy?
The continued existence of a true joint tenancy requires that
there be present each of the four co-existing common law unities
of time, title, interest and possession and a loss of any one of
these unities destroys the joint tenancy.4 In the Buford case the
land sale contract destroyed the unities of title, interest and pos-
session by the very fact that the right of ownership and posses-
sion were contracted away by both joint tenants. Thus, any
joint tenancy in the real estate was destroyed. By equitable con-
2 "It has been frequently and consistently decided by this court, as it
is quite unanimously agreed by courts generally, that if the owner of real
estate enters into a contract of sale whereby the purchaser agrees to buy
and the owner agrees to sell it and the vendor retains the legal title un-
til the purchase money or some part of it is paid. the ownership of the
real estate as such passes to and vests in the purchaser...." Buford v.
Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 42, 43, 62 N.W.2d 252, 254, 255 (1954).
3 "After the destruction of a joint tenancy by a joint tenant, nothing
more than a tenancy in common remains." Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb.
716, 720. 32 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1948).
4Buford v. Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 44, 62 N.W.2d 252, 255 (1954);
Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 377, 297 N.W. 595, 597 (1941). Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 76-118 (Reissue 1950) permits one owning property to convey
to himself and others in order to create a joint tenancy. Prior to adoption
of this statute, this method of conveyancing would not create a joint
tenancy because all four of the common law unities of time, title, interest
and possession were necessary for its creation. However, the statute does
not disturb the rule that, during the jointure, the tenants are required to
have one and the same interest resulting from the same conveyance, com-
mencing at the same time and accompanied by individual possession.
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version the contract and its benefits, in effect, replaced the real
estate, and, therefore, the incidents of a tenancy in common at-
tached with equal vigor to the equitably converted property. This
conclusion seems sound for at least two reasons: (1) Where a
joint tenancy is the type of ownership held in the real estate and
it is destroyed by the loss of one of the four unities, the type of
ownership, if any, which will remain, in the absence of language
creating any other type of ownership, is at most a tenancy in
common.5 And where all the joint tenants join in the contract to
sell their interests, no real estate remains to be held under a
tenancy in common. Therefore, it would be illogical and incon-
sistent to state that a joint tenancy should then attach to com-
pletely different property which, by the law of equity, replaces
the real estate which the joint tenants no longer own. (2) Fur-
thermore, it would be illogical and inconsistent to attach a joint
tenancy to the property replacing the real estate sold since the
law does not favor joint tenancies,6 and, because of this, the courts
of Nebraska have flatly stated that joint tenancies may be
created only by contracts from which the language is sufficiently
clear to indicate that the parties intended to create a joint ten-
ancy.7 In the Buford case there was no showing that the parties
intended that a joint tenancy of the proceeds exist.
B. WHY PARTIES FAVOR JOINT TENANCIES
Though Nebraska law appears to scorn the creation and
existence of joint tenancies, it must be recognized that property
owners apparently do favor them. This conclusion is based on
the estimate that fifty percent or more of the real estate con-
veyances which are recorded are conveyances in joint tenancy.-
Many people have conveyed property which they owned as in-
dividuals in order to effect joint titles in themselves and others.9
The bulk of such conveyances are between husband and wife. 0
Because of the popularity of joint tenancy ownership, especi-
ally between husand and wife, Buford v. Dahike represents a
5 See note 3 supra.
1 Bodeman v. Cary, 152 Neb. 506, 41 N.W.2d 797 (1950); In re Estate
of Vance, 149 Neb. 220, 30 N.W.2d 677 (1948); Olander v. City of Omaha,
142 Neb. 340, 6 N.W.2d 62 (1942).
7Buford v. Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954); Sanderson
v. Everson, 93 Neb. 606, 141 N.W. 1025 (1913).
S See Moodie, Some of the Dangers of Joint Tenancy, 29 Neb. L. Rev.
235 (1950).
OSee discussion of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-118, note 4 supra.
10 See note 8 supra.
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situation which might often arise in land sale transactions involv-
ing jointly held property.
It is quite understandable that a husband and wife may wish
to place property "in both their names." No doubt one major
reason for this, in addition to any tax advantages, is that they
regard themselves as a marital team or partnership to share
equally the enjoyment of the property and, because of this, they
want the property to go to the surviving spouse if one should die.
With this intent apparent it might be reasonably assumed that
a husband and wife holding property in joint tenancy also have
the same intention when payments are received on a contract
for the sale of the property. If this intent was present in the
Buford case, it was defeated by the very contract which the
Dahlkes' made as vendors. What then could have been done to
effectuate such an intent?
Placing the contract payments in joint tenancy has another
benefit from the point of view of the surviving joint tenant. After
the death of one joint tenant, the survivor is in a position to ac-
cept full payment of the balance of the contract price from the
vendee if such payment is tendered. This advantage may be
particularly important where the surviving joint tenant is the
wife of the deceased and needs the money for her own subsistence
and for other dependents. If, however, the payments on the
contract are to be paid in the same manner as in the Buford case
(i.e. to husband and wife), the administrator will claim one-half
of the contract payments and may not agree to a settlement of
the balance. Where payments are deferred for several years at
a high interest rate, the administrator or executor may wish to
continue the contract in order to obtain interest payments as as-
sets to be distributed from the estate.
C. COULD A JOINT TENANCY BE CREATED IN THE
LAND SALE CONTRACT PAYMENTS?
A joint tenancy may be created in any property capable of
having the incidents of ownership, whether it be real or personal,"-
so long as the joint tenancy is established by contract. 2 Pay-
ments made or to be made on a land sale contract would certainly
qualify as a type of property capable of being "owned."
The land sale contract involved in the Buford case referred
11 "The relation of and estate of joint tenancies may be created in any
kind of personal property that is subject to be held in severalty." In re
Estate of Johnson, 116 Neb. 686, 218 N.W. 739 (1928).
12 See note 7 supra.
NOTES
to the Dahlkes' (vendors) as "husband and wife" and in no other
capacity. It would seem that if the contract had been written
requiring payments to be made to "Ernest R. Dahlke and Laura
H. Dahlke, husband and wife as joint tenants" or ".... as joint
tenants and not as tenants in common", a joint tenancy in the
proceeds of the contract would have been created.
I1. Must The Vendee Obtain a Deed From The Surviving Joint
Tenant and The Personal Representative?
Assuming that a joint tenancy is created in the land sale
contract payments and payment has been made to the surviving
joint tenant, there remains for consideration the question of
whether the vendee must obtain deeds from both the surviving
joint tenant and the personal representative of the deceased joint
tenant's estate in order to gain complete clear title. This ques-
tion has been the subject of a great deal of discussion since the
Buford case was decided. No Nebraska cases have been found
which bear directly on the problem. The remainder of this arti-
cle is devoted to pointing out arguments in an attempt to resolve
this question.
Where the surviving vendor is entitled to all of the contract
benefits and accepts from the vendee full payment prior to the
maximum time that the contract is to be in force, the vendee would
then be entitled to his deed from the surviving vendor. Such a
deed would convey all interest from such vendor. But to deter-
mine whether a deed should be required from the deceased ven-
dor's estate necessarily depends on whether the estate received
any interest which is or co~uld be adverse to that of the vendee.
The land sale contract and its benefits have vested, by sur-
vivorship, in the surviving joint tenant and no interest in this
property passes to the estate of the deceased joint tenant. The
only remaining interest which the estate could claim must be in
the legal title held by the vendors as security for the contracted
debt. But the "legal title" held by the vendors is, in reality, a
fiction of the law. No tangible evidence of the "title" exists. It
is a point of the law which has been developed to protect vendors
by giving them a remedy which is analogous to that of one who
sells land and takes back a mortgage.13 The vendors under a
13 In Sparks v. Hess, 15 Cal. 186 (1860), cited with approval in Hendrix
v. Barker, 49 Neb. 369, 68 N.W. 531 (1896), the court stated at 194:
"In the present case, the vendors have retained the legal title, and evi-
dently as security for the purchase money. Their position is, in some
respects, similar to what it would have been had they executed a con-
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land sale contract may, upon breach of contract, treat the con-
tract as an ordinary mortgage and foreclose on it thereby forcing
a sale of the property"- and, under special and peculiar circum-
stances, the vendor may be granted a decree of strict foreclosure.15
The legal title, then, is used merely as a means to enforce a debt
owing to the vendors. Therefore, it seems only logical and con-
sistent that the means of enforcing the debt should belong to
the one to whom the debt is owing, that person being the surviv-
ing joint tenant of the contract payments. This being so, the
conclusion must necessarily be that the deceased's estate received
no interest in the legal title held as security.
It must then follow that a deed to the vendee from the sur-
viving joint tenant would convey good and clear title to the prop-
erty and no deed would be required from the administrator or
executor of the deceased joint tenant.
But where, as in the Buford case, the land sale contract and
its benefits are not held in joint tenancy but under a tenancy in
veyance to the vendee and taken from him a mortgage upon the property.
A mortgage is in form a conveyance of the legal title, though intended
only as security for the debt. Here the title is retained by the vendors
for a similar purpose of security. A mortgagee may pursue his remedy
at law, or proceed in equity for a sale of the premises. A vendor retain-
ing the title may in like manner sue at law for the balance of the pur-
chase money, or file his bill in equity for the specific performance of the
contract, and take an alternative decree that if the purchaser will not
accept the conveyance and pay the purchase money, the premises be sold
to raise such money ......
14 Hendrix v. Barker, 49 Neb. 369, 68 N.W. 531 (1896); Gardels v.
Kloke, 36 Neb. 493, 54 N.W. 834 (1893).
15 "If the vendee or purchaser has not been guilty of gross laches, nor
unreasonably negligent in performing the contract, a strict foreclosure
should be refused on the ground that it would be unjust, even though
the vendee may have been slightly in default in making of a payment.
So, for the same reason, a strict foreclosure will be denied where the
premises have greatly increased in value since the sale, or where the
amount of the unpaid purchase money is much less than the value of the
property. On the other hand, if the vendee, without sufficient excuse,
fails to make his payments according to the stipulations of his contract,
and for an unreasonable time remains in default, the vendor may have a
strict foreclosure of the contract for the sale and purchase of the land,
unless some principle of equity would be thereby violated." Harrington v.
Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176, 186, 187, 56 N.W. 961, 964 (1893). See Warner,
Equity-Vendor and Purchaser-Time Stipulations-Forfeitures-Fore-
closure, 13 Neb. L. Bull. 281, 287, 288 (1934-35); see also Farmers and
Merchants State Bank v. Thornburg, 54 Neb. 782, 78 N.W. 45 (1898).

